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Introduction
In October 2007, the Gregg Centre hosted its annual conference on the
theme “From Sarajevo to Kandahar: Rescuing Failed States in Historical
Perspective.” In keeping with the centre’s ‘tradition’ the conference brought
together scholars, students, soldiers, and civilian practitioners with experience in
the subject. His Excellency Omar Samad, Ambassador of Afghanistan, opened
the conference with an erudite and impassioned address on the challenge of
rebuilding his shattered country. He was followed by a variety of speakers whose
talks spanned the range of ‘failed state’ crises and conflicts that have dominated
the headlines over the last 20 years: the Balkans, Somalia, Darfur, Haiti, Iraq, and
Afghanistan. Six of the academic papers, revised and edited, are included in this
theme section.
Derek Fraser opens the discussion with a definition of a failed state and an
explanation of why they matter — because they can pose a threat to internation-
al peace. He suggests that since the cost of rescuing such states is considerable,
it would be preferable to prevent them from failing. But the problem is not going
to go away, and we will have to maintain, if not increase, our efforts to respond
to the problems they pose.
David Reilly makes three main arguments. First, the domestic conditions
of failing and failed states shape their international behavior, and their interna-
tional circumstances exacerbate their internal failings. Second, established states
and failing/failed states engage in different functions. The former are focused on
state expansion activities while the latter are attempting to build a new state.
Finally, like Fraser he argues that this problem of failing states is not going away;
in fact, a collision course between these two types of states is inevitable.
In his presentation on the Canadian mission in Somalia, Grant Dawson
takes a contrarian approach to the conventional wisdom, which — focusing on
the torture and murder of a Somali civilian — holds that the Canadian effort was
a disaster. Dawson points out that in the Somalia operation one can see the gen-
esis of the “3D” (Defence, Development, Diplomacy) approach which now so
clearly defines the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The Canadian Forces first
worked to establish security, then encouraged Somalis to embrace the peace-
making process. The Canadians “led from behind,” working with and encourag-
ing local leaders to define community needs and projects. Finally, they engaged
other Canadian government agencies to provide the development and recon-
struction resources. However, he cautions readers about the perils of drawing
‘lessons’ from the Somalia case, if only because one lesson that could be drawn
easily would be to avoid such operations altogether and leave failed states to fes-
ter. He argues that the application of the 3D approach in Afghanistan was simply
a case of doing ‘what works.’ The real lesson of Somalia, he says, is that rescu-
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ing failed states requires patience — years, even decades, of commitment — and
huge amounts of money, talented people, and political will.
Patrice McMahon and Andrea Talentino cast critical eyes on the experi-
ence of nation re-building in the Balkans.  McMahon notes that the United States
has been an active nation-builder, aiming not only to put states back together but
ultimately to recreate and transform them.  This article argues that the Bush
administration’s ideological beliefs, specifically what some have called “doctri-
nal unilateralism,” led that administration to ignore important lessons wrought
from the Balkans. Specifically, the Bosnia case demonstrated that stabilization
and reconstruction were difficult, time consuming tasks; that coercive military
force alone was not sufficient for peace-building; that multilateralism was cru-
cial to the success of these missions; and finally, that American or Western lib-
eral values and institutions are sometimes self-defeating, especially when they
are forced on a country. Unfortunately, these lessons did not conform to the
world view of the president or his view of how the US should execute its foreign
policies. Talentino argues that while the international operations in both Bosnia
and Kosovo have been profoundly successful to some degree — violence is
absent, new governments have taken hold, and elections are considered free and
fair — these successes are heavily qualified.  Ethnic tensions remain high, local
actors remain resistant to consensual modes of governance, and both places are
considered relatively unstable.  That is not surprising, as research shows that
international peace-building is more successful at addressing immediate security
needs than at building effective institutions.
Finally, Julian Schofield turns his attention to the complex relationship
between nation-building in Afghanistan and that country’s relationship with its
influential neighbour: Pakistan. The success of NATO’s strategy to strengthen
the new Kabul regime depends on its intersection with Pakistani policies.
Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan, in turn, is tied to its broader security policy
against India. This is complicated by Afghan-Pakistan disputes over territory,
Afghan refusal to recognize the Durand Line as the international border,
Pakistan’s interdiction of third-party trade to and from Afghanistan, and a histo-
ry of Afghan sponsorship of secessionism in Pakistan. All of these contribute to
Pakistan’s reluctance to contribute to the stabilization of Afghanistan by closing
the insurgent sanctuaries in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. NATO has
few non-escalatory military options. It has two remaining venues of influence.
First, its presence acts as a restraint on Afghan provocation of secessionism,
thereby satisfying one of Islamabad’s goals. Second, NATO could offer positive
trade and aid incentives to Pakistan to gradually withdraw its support to those
elements of its society that foment Pakhtun insurgency in Afghanistan (and
Pakistan). The long-term effect of such a strategy would be a gradual economic
integration and normalization of the Afghan and Pakistan frontier areas.
If there is a single message which emerges from these articles, it is that
‘rescuing failed states’ is harder than it looks at first; it is not to be undertaken
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lightly. It requires a commitment of many kinds of resources; of policies that are
sensitive to local politics, cultures, and agendas; and of the patience to see them
through. None of these are easy. But, since the problem of failed states is unlike-
ly to disappear any time soon, we had better approach the task with a clear under-
standing of what will be required of us.
